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ALAN

F. WESTIN. New York: Atheneum. 1967.

This book might have been called Privacy, Technology, and Law,
for it was the interrelation of those three that occasioned the study from
which the book derives. Once again, the profession is indebted to the
imagination and the sense of public responsibility of the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York. Nearly a decade ago, the Association
established a Special Committee on Science and Law. In 1962, when
the Committee began to make its comprehensive investigation into "the
impact of modern technology on privacy," it chose Professor Westin as
research director for the project-and that happy choice is now reflected in a book largely devoted to issues raised by the new technology
but entitled Privacy and Freedom.
The title, I think, is significant, because it emphasizes that the
various forms of privacy serve an instrumental role, protecting values
and interests so diverse that they can only be brought together under
a heading as abstract as "freedom." Indeed, one of the book's chief
merits is that Professor Westin has carefully separated the very large
number of questions that composed the Special Committee's general
subject of inquiry, reducing the questions to manageable proportions
and analyzing them according to the various and disparate interests
involved.
Usually it makes no difference whether we classify an interest as
"primary" or "instrumental." Of course there is a sense in which all
rights, all interests, are instrumental. But privacy as a concept of legal
doctrine can profit from such scrutiny. For there are, from time to
time, suggestions that the inquiry should be broadened, not narrowed
-that the real claim at stake is the claim of the "right to be let alone."
Thus it is said:
A person may be asserting his right of "privacy" when he dresses in
in an unorthodox way or when he "loafs" in a public park. A person may claim the right to be let alone when he acts publicly as
when he acts privately. Its essence is the claim that there is a sphere
of space that has not been dedicated to public use or control.1
If Professor Westin had gone in that analytical direction, perhaps we
should have had a book entitled simply Freedom, for the "right to be
let alone" is as vast as freedom itself. Although some purposes are
served by recognizing the kinship of privacy issues to other issues in1 Konvitz, Privacy and the Law: A PhilosophicalPrelude, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
272, 279-80 (1966) (footnotes omitted).
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volving individual freedom, I think that Professor Westin and the
Special Committee wisely decided to focus on privacy itself-on the
disclosure of information. As this book shows, that subject is quite
large enough to justify a major inquiry and analysis.
The book begins with a collection from the work product of the
social sciences on the functions (psychological, social, political) that
the various forms of privacy serve in our society, along with marginal
comparisons to other societies. The new technology of privacy invasion
is then catalogued in truly fascinating detail. (Here Professor Westin
cheerfully notes that the fascination of snooping is something we all
feel, and he properly concludes that there are real values on the side of
curiosity and investigation.) Finally, through the use of "case studies," 2
Professor Westin approaches the legal and institutional questions that
prompted the study.
The legislative proposals are necessarily sketchy; this is not the
place for a draft of a model statute. The book's most important contribution consists not in these proposals, but rather in Professor
Westin's analysis of the interests that should be taken into account in
regulating the acquisition of information claimed to be private. In fact,
some of his legislative proposals are simply charters for judicial or administrative elaboration of rather general expressions of concern for
privacy; the legislative choices, in other words, are left to case-by-case
evaluations of the competing considerations in different contexts.
What are Professor Westin's criteria for decision? In his concluding section on "Policy Choices for the 1970's," he bears down most
heavily on these:
-"the seriousness of the need to conduct surveillance"
-"alternative methods to meet the need: the burden of proof"
-"reliability of the instrument"
-"the issue of consent: expressed, implied, or coerced?"
--"capacity for limitation and control" (of surveillance operations).
This analysis is a privacy-oriented version of the familiar legislative
balancing that is the essence of the lawmaker's function, whether he
be the draftsman of a statute, a judge deciding an issue of due process,
2 The "case studies" (really, problem-area studies) begin with the problem of
eavesdropping, about which we have learned much from Professor Westin over the years.
Succeeding chapters deal with the polygraph, psychological testing, subliminal advertising,
and the storage of personal data. On the latter point, I wish that Professor Westin had
been more concerned with the problem of improving the accuracy of data files, a
problem that seems to me more critical in the long run than the companion problem
of regulating access to the files.
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or a police chief issuing regulations to govern his force. It is exactly
the kind of inquiry that the Supreme Court properly made in reaching
its recent eavesdropping decisions-with appropriate citation to Pro,
fessor Westin.3
But this inquiry, as delineated by the factors listed above, seems
incomplete. With the exception of the penultimate one, the factors are
concerned exclusively with the state's-interest side of the balance. To
put it another way, Professor Westin's concluding analysis creates the
impression that the principal variables in this decisional process are
on the side of the justifications that may be asserted for invading the
interest in privacy. Such a conclusion would fail to do justice to Professor Westin's own careful work at the outset of the book, where he
has catalogued the various interests in privacy. The point is simply a
cautionary one: there are variables on both sides of the legislative
balance, and the balance may be struck differently according to the
kind of interest that is invaded. The danger is that lawyers who read
the book, in their occupational prejudice toward proposals for action,
will treat the analysis of privacy's many non-faces as simply a preliminary to the book's real point. To the lawyer's general motto of "Read
On," we must add a caveat: "Reread."
In the context of this book's accomplishment, that last concern
turns out to be a quibble. The Special Committee's study and the
book it produced were needed, first, to put the whole social question of
privacy invasions before us, but, second, and in the long run more important, to raise the question piece by piece, not as an exercise in defining terms, but as a series of disparate issues of social control. That
latter function is rarely a crowd pleaser. But it is the essence of the
lawyer's craft, and Professor Westin has done his work well.
Kenneth L. Karst*
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